PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF LINGUISTICS
Vol. 11, Number 1 (June 1980)

PRAGMATICS AND THE SEARCH FOR CONTEXT IN LINGUISTICS[1]

KENNETH GREGERSON
Summer Institute of Linguistics

Once you open a can of worms,
the only way to recan them is
to use a larger can.

Zymurgy's first law of evolving
systems dynamics (Bloch 1979)

1. 'PROGRESS' IN LINGUISTICS

'Progress', some will say, is too optimistic a description of the tortuous path that our discipline has taken through history. And current conceptions of the philosophy of science have turned from the older, 'gentler' view that successive scholars by 'standing on the shoulders' of their illustrious predecessors are thereby enabled to peer a bit further into their subject. By contrast, the Twentieth Century has shifted to 'revolution' in science (Kuhn 1970) in which one theoretical paradigm is abruptly toppled to be replaced by yet another. This latter kind of explanation is best appreciated by observing that, by its very nature, theory building is a metaphorical process. Stephen Pepper (1972:91-2), describing what he called the 'root-metaphor method' for creating 'world-hypotheses', put it this way:

> A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of common-sense fact and tries . . . to understand other areas in terms of this one. This original area becomes then his basic analogy or root metaphor. He describes as best he can the characteristics of this area, or, if you will, discriminates its structure. A list of its structural characteristics becomes his basic concepts of explanation and description. We call them a set of categories. In terms of these categories he proceeds to study all other areas of fact whether uncriticized or previously criticized. He undertakes to interpret all facts in terms of these categories. As a result of the impact of these other facts upon his categories, he may qualify and readjust the categories, so that a set of categories commonly changes and develops.
>
> Since the basic analogy or root metaphor normally (and probably at least in part necessarily) arises out of common sense, a great deal of development and refinement of a set of categories is required if they are to prove adequate for an hypothesis of unlimited scope. Some root metaphors prove more fertile than others, have greater powers of expansion and of adjustment. These survive in comparison with the others and generate the relatively adequate world theories.

Thus, for example, Nineteenth Century linguistics, influenced by the intellectual preoccupation of its day with natural organisms and their development through time, not unpredictably adopted *change* as its root metaphor and declared that the only scientific study of language is an *historical* one (the classic Neogrammarian view of Hermann Paul).

By contrast the Twentieth Century having shifted attention from what Pepper called an *organistic* view of things, and having projected rather a *mechanistic* model on

[1]Keynote address at the annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of the Philippines at the Language Study Center of the Philippine Normal College on May 9, 1980.

the world, finds it natural to ask the question 'how does it work' rather than 'how did it get this way'. Thus *synchrony, function* and *system* became the key notions. And though de Saussure gets regularly credited with shaping modern linguistics in this fashion, he was, as a matter of fact, simply responding in large measure to the emerging metaphor of his time.

Now, having agreed that a paradigm or root metaphor-changing account of linguistic history is indeed enlightening, is it still possible to discern any persistent 'direction' or cumulative result in the general study of language? I think it is.

To begin with, let us observe that Nineteenth Century linguistics was fundamentally concerned with the *relationships among sounds* (even letters!), to be sure, from an historical perspective. In saying this, I do not disregard the attention given in that period to the interpretation of ancient texts (philology), the collection of oral literature by the brothers Grimm, or the efforts at comparative syntax of Delbruk. But the fact remains that the brilliant achievements of that era having primarily to do with the reconstruction of proto-forms by elaborating a system of *sound*-correspondences.

The arrival of the Twentieth Century with its shift of world view (revolution if you will) seems not, however, to have shifted its focus of primary attention in language. For, in spite of speculation and some work on the whole range of things linguistic, the first three decades or so of this century, may, I think, be fairly clearly characterized as the age of phonology. That is, the experience gained in the historical analysis of sounds and the increasing sophistication of practical and experimental phonetic observation were harnessed to functionalist notions to produce the concept of *phoneme.* The writings of de Courtenay, Trubetzkoy, Sapir, Swadesh and Twaddell and others on the bases of phonology stand out as particularly representative of the concerns of linguistics at that period.

The next two or three decades, say through the 1960's, saw linguists, armed with the structural notions worked out in phonology ('emes', 'allos', etc.), looking now 'beyond the phoneme' to what they called *grammar.* A unit called *morpheme,* though identified by earlier linguists and meaning somewhat different things on different sides of the Atlantic, came to be treated as parallel in some sense with phoneme and the consequences of that assumption were worked out. How to handle 'morpheme alternants', 'cranberry morphs', 'portmanteaus' and how or if phonemes actually 'made up' morphemes were all interesting topics then. 'Mixing levels' was the cardinal sin and Pike was pronounced guilty for his 'grammatical prerequisites to phonemic analysis'. Nida summed up morphology in one comprehensive work.

About this time *syntax* could often be simply described as 'the last nine pages of a grammar'. The tools available were basically those that the Greeks left to traditional grammar and these often seemed inadequate for the description of the non-Indo European syntaxes that linguists were grappling with. But, again looking beyond the morpheme (or word), a number of workers were beginning a more vigorous approach to the sentence. In Europe Prague School linguists (Firbas, Vachek) were elaborating ideas of Mathesius on *functional sentence perspective.* Martinet was developing *functional syntax.* In England Firth was influencing a functionalist approach that yielded the *scale and category* grammar of Halliday. In the U.S., Rulon Wells was defining an *immediate constituent analysis.* Pike was adding function to a constituent analysis and calling this 'slot-class correlation' a *grammeme,* later (recruiting a term of Bloomfield's *tagmeme.* Chomsky, critical of linguistic theory as method and skeptical of the adequacy of a purely constituent description of syntax, looked for his inspiration to logical syntax and came upon the idea of *transformation* making it the organizing concept (root metaphor)

of his work. Lamb took up the functionalist approach of Hjelmslev to view grammar as a network of relations across the various (and varying!) strata of language. Virtually all modern efforts in syntax may be associated in one way or another with these developments.

Now if my account of the history of the trends of linguistics has been accurate, we are ready to predict that once the 'can of worms' of syntax had been spilled, the next 'bigger' container available was semantics. This sequence has been particularly dramatic on the recent American linguistic scene. However, given the Bloomfieldian pessimism about the possibilities for the analysis of meaning and the post-Bloomfieldian methodological rejection of the use of meaning in formal analysis by e.g. Trager, Bloch, and Harris, one can see how a strong antidote of semantics would ultimately be called for.

In general, the 'anthropological (and socio-) linguists' never abandoned meaning as a practical and theoretical component of linguistic description, though it was not highly developed. Pike, for example, has at all times insisted on the recognition of language as a 'form-meaning composite'. Nida wrote on 'a system for the description of semantic elements' in 1951 and entered the following optimistic note in 1958 (259):

> Meaning, the indispensable helper, but often repudiated friend, of science, is at last coming into her own. Information theory, the advance of anthropology into the realm of personality and group psychology, the inevitable necessity of structural linguists to deal with meaning (despite its lack of structural neatness), and political events in our present world have all joined to force upon us an awareness of the necessity, importance, and scientific basis of communication.

Chomsky, on the other hand, while accepting the ultimate need (or at least desirability) to account for meaning, felt such work could – in fact must – wait to be erected on the foundations of a firm and formal syntax presumably along lines sketched in his 1957 *Syntactic Structures.*

The urge to place syntax in the 'larger' frame of reference of meaning was restrained in generative theory until Katz's 1963 *The Structure of a Semantic Theory,* which proposed a process wherein recursive projection rules construct semantic readings for phrases and sentences out of the readings assigned to surface morphemes. Then in 1964, however, Katz and Postal argued that it was deep not surface syntactic structures that needed to be semantically interpreted. As is well known, from there on 'deep' got deeper until syntactic deep structures were identified as wholly *semantic* by the *Generative Semanticists* (e.g. McCawley, Lakoff, etc.). Opposing this view, of course, are the *Interpretive Semanticists* (e.g. Jakendoff and Chomsky himself), for whom syntax must be as 'surface' as possible in order to make semantics the repository of all 'deep' meaningful features. Put in terms of the Zymurgy's 'wormy law', generative semanticists say, 'Let's get a bigger can (no matter how big it takes) for syntax, namely semantics.' In response, interpretive semanticists answer, 'Nothing doing, all the worms go back into the little can (even if you need to snip off a tail here and there)! '

It would not be too much out of the way, then, to label roughly the mid 60's through the mid 70's as the *decade of semantics,* perhaps especially so for American linguistics. For generative grammar Fodor's (1977) *Semantics* provides a very representative survey. The publication of Nida's (1975) *Exploring Semantics Structures,* Lyons two volume (1977) *Semantics,* Leech's (1974) *Semantics* and hosts of other similar titles reflects this crescendo of interest in the study of meaning at about this period.

2. PRAGMATICS: THE BIG CAN/THE ULTIMATE CONTEXT

If I may be permitted one final chapter in my 'wormy' history of linguistics, I would like to try to bring us up to date and look ahead at what appears to be the strongest contender as the focus of linguistics well into the 1980's.

Fodor (1977:204) in her assessment of current trends in generative semantics observed:

> Chomsky's original demarcation of syntax from semantics was intended as an instance of 'divide and conquer'. The expected result was a narrowly constrained theory of language structure, which could then be meshed with a separate theory of language use, or perhaps with a number of different theories dealing with production and perception processes, stylistic preferences, pragmatic constraints, and so on. Generative semanticists consider that such *compartmentalization is impossible*, and that far from simplifying grammatical description by abstracting linguistic facts from these other matters, it can be shown that they all form one complex indivisible system. Facts about the world, about their relative social status, and so on, must all be fed into the grammar which determines the form-meaning correlations for the language.
>
> One argument to this effect comes from Lakoff's study of hedges. Lakoff argues that it is not sufficient for the grammar to specify only the meaning of a word . . . The dictionary must also include a specification of the *pragmatic* properties of the word, such as its connotations . . . Lakoff draws the general moral that *semantics is not independent from pragmatics.* (emphases mine, KG).

What is painted for us here is a picture of one group of modern linguists reaching for the last can, the big one – pragmatics, a theory of use. That is, Chinese box-like, as phonology 'make sense' only against a background of morphology and syntax, and they in turn only gain relevance in light of meaning, that is, semantics, so meaning itself seems to call for 'meaners' – people who *use* sentences to mean things and induce action.

Though Wittgenstein at one time declared that meaning *is* use, others have found it useful to make a distinction between the study of meaning and the study of use. Morris (1938) offered the following triad with respect to his theory of signs:

Syntax: the relation of sign to sign.

Semantics: the relation of sign to referent.

Pragmatics: the relation of sign to user.

The question of language use has been one of longstanding interest to philosophy and it is, of course, inspiration from that source that has spurred some of the recent work on *speech acts* in linguistics. The by now widely heralded William James lectures by the philosopher J. L. Austin (1962) on *How to do things with words,* taught linguists to distinguish locutionary, perlocutionary, and illocutionary acts. We learned too that *performative* utterances such as 'I promise that . . .' or 'I tell you that. . .' in which the speaker makes explicit announcement of what he is doing with his words, could be a very interesting subject for research. This was picked up by Ross (1970) when he wrote 'On declarative sentences' to show how speech acts could be incorporated into generative syntax. Searle (1976) reclassified Austin's illocutionary acts as Representatives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, and Declarations. Sadock (1974) outlined in a generative semantic framework his contributions *Toward a linguistic theory of speech acts.* The 'logic' of conversation has been brought to the attention of linguists by Grice (1975) in connection with what he calls 'conversational implicatures'.

Another quarter from which for a long time sustained appeals have come for the study of language as it is used is, of course, anthropology.

Malinowsky (1964:63) writing on the 'dilemma of contemporary linguistics' *in 1937* took the following view:

> If the earliest and most fundamental function of speech is pragmatic – to direct, to control, and to correlate human activities – then obviously no study of speech except within the 'context of situation' is legitimate. The distinction between *language* and *speech,* still supported by such writers as Bühler and Gardiner,

but dating back to de Saussure and Wegener, will have to be dropped. Language cannot remain an independent and self-contained subject of study . . . .

Four decades after Malinowski wrote, Gumperz (1975:xv) prefaced a work on *sociocultural dimensions of language* use with the following assessment of the contribution of linguistic theory to his subject:

> Until quite recently, modern linguistics dealt only with the literal sense of isolated sentences, and our theories of grammar, especially those of Chomsky and of most other theoretical linguists, reflect this limitation. The questions of speaker's interpretation of context-bound messages and of the role of grammatical rules in this interpretation are still, in large part, unresolved. There is considerable controversy among linguists as to whether grammatical theory is capable of dealing with this issue. Until we learn more about speaking practices in a variety of settings, there is little hope of resolving the conflict.
>
> In an effort to remedy the almost complete lack of attention to the facts of language usage, ethnographers of communication have launched a detailed set of studies dealing with speaking in culturally specific settings.

As an anthropologist, Greenberg (1964:28), writing three decades ago on 'linguistics and ethnology', notes the tendency of linguistics of that period to deal with the more 'inherently self-contained' area of syntax to the exclusion of culturally involved questions of language. Citing Morris' tripartite division of the theory of signs (semiotic) into syntax, semantics and pragmatics, he comments:

> Present-day descriptive linguists strive towards formulations in which elements are defined by a purely formal procedure without reference to meaning. While it is in syntactics that recent linguistics has made its most significant methodologic progress, the remoteness of this aspect of language has led to the recurrent complaints of the cultural scientist against the irrelevance to his problem of a large portion of contemporary linguistics.
>
> With the pragmatic aspect of language we arrive at the point where the interest of the ethnologist is greatest and that of the linguist merely marginal. In general, the linguist is not interested in what the speakers of a language say on specific occasions. His own material is gathered, as such material must, from pragmatic observations of the language behavior of specific informants, but though these pragmatic aspects are primary in his actual research, formulation of results is made without reference to the speaker. The linguist has always been interested in *la langue*, not *la parole*, and this classic distinction in linguistics corresponds to the division of language into syntactics and semantics on the one hand, and pragmatics on the other.

3. MODELLING PRAGMATICS

A comprehensive approach to linguistic description within a pragmatic model must, through prose or picture, represent the salient elements and relations in as explicit a fashion as possible. Various accounts have been given. I have already referred to some. I shall not here attempt anything like an exhaustive enumeration of such accounts, but I will mention a few.

Bloomfield was concerned with the description of overt observable linguistic form. But he was at the same time well aware of the need to place linguistic form in the broader context of practical human events. Viewing the situation through mechanistic and behavioristic eyes, he distinguished *practical events* from *acts of speech* and described both in terms of stimulus and reaction (using S, R for practical events and s, r for speech behavior). Thus, a non-speech reaction (R) to a non-speech stimulus (S) in the practical world is represented as:

Relating such Stimulus-Reaction to his subject, Bloomfiled (1933:24) observed that 'language enables one person to make a reaction (R) when another person has the stimulus (S)'. The act of speech then becomes a link comprised of 'linguistic substitute stimulus' (s) mediating broader practical events involving two people ('Jack and Jill'). The whole scheme may be diagrammed as:

S ⋙——→ r . . . . s ⋙——→ R

practical events — acts of speech — practical events

Jill — Jack

Malinowski (and later Firth), as referred to earlier, could well (though I do not know that he ever did) have diagrammed his view of language as use in something like the following wav:

situation

person x (speech) person y

('parole')

J. L. Austin's model of the speech act may be summarized as something like the following:

Locutionary Act	Illocutionary Act	Perlocutionary Act
expression, propositional content	intended primary 'force' of the utterance	side effects of the utterance (intended or not)

That is, a speaker uttering words simultaneously accomplishes more than one act in so doing.

Hymes's(1972) Mnemonic Model of the components of Speech Acts is as follows:

S Setting: time and place
Scene: psychological setting (formal/informal; festive/serious

P Participants: speaker/sender; addressor; hearer/receiver/ audience; addressee

E Ends (purposes): outcomes and goals

A Act sequence: message form and content

K Key: tone, manner, or spirit

I Instrumentalities: channels (areal, written, etc.) and forms (language, dialect, register, etc.) as the means of speaking

N Norms of interaction: the rule-governed proprieties of speaking (not interrupting, whispering in church, etc.)

Norms of interpretation: the manners in which one interprets speech behavior of others

G Genres: poems, myths, lecture, riddle, etc.

Just to show his ingenuity Hymes even shows that French speakers can remember this model too by using *PARLANT* to summarize; *participants, actes, raison (resultat), locale, agents (instrumentalities), normes, ton (key), types (genres).*

Verschueren (1977) offers the following model of the speech act:



Verschueren intends here to isolate the basic factors and claim that the speech act enters into the following four relations:

1. The relation with language (L): that is, the speech act (SA) imposes certain requirements on the linguistic structures which manifest it.
2. The relation with the world (W): SA's reflect their cultural setting. This includes Grice's speech maxims: 'Be as informative as required'; 'say only what you believe true'; 'be relevant'; 'don't be obscure, but do be succinct'.
3. The relation with the speaker (S): SA's reflect the attitude or psychological state of the speaker.
4. The relation with the hearer (H): This relation involves the effect upon the hearer as intended by the speaker (represented by the arrow).

A stratificational network scheme for the communication process is partially represented by the following diagram (after Fleming, m.s.):



Fig. 1 The communication process.
(Ilah Fleming, m.s. 1978)

J. R. Ross (1970) inspired by Austin's treatment of performatives suggested that all declarative sentences could be derived from a syntactic deep structure representation of the following type:



'I declare to you (message).'

The main observation to be made here is that speech acts were being viewed from a syntactic perspective with speakers and addressees modelled in terms of NP's and V's modified by some sort of abstract diacritic features.

In an attempt to reinterpret the speech act *semantically* I suggested (Gregerson 1971) the following:



DECL
INTERROG
IMP
GREET
etc.

MESSAGE FORM

MESSAGE CONTENT

Here the speech process is viewed more abstractly in terms of a predicate calculus of sorts in which the 'illocutionary force', predicate-like, is a function (MOOD) which takes an associated set of terms or arguments.

The semantic model suggested above had some appeal – especially in contrast to a purely syntactic account; however, it was oversimplified. It failed, for example, to make explicit that speakers and addressees could be inhabitants of different times and locations from each other. Though this is often practically unimportant in everyday face to face conversation, it is crucial for phone calls to Mars or accounting for messages like the following:

(1) 'By the time you read this, I will be dead'. A further, and more important point, is that the speech act or situation involves fundamentally different objects the characterization of which calls for pragmatic rather than semantic constructs.

The communication act tree below (Gregerson 1976, revised) is intended to express the fundamental idea that communication involves a *communicative source* (CS) which determines (DET) in some sense the internal state of a *communicative goal* (CG). However, each of these, CS and CG, is internally complex. First, with reference to the CS the tree exhibits a threeway conjunction of a *volitional* (VOL) function, a *presuppositional* (PRESP) function, and an *attitudinal* (ATT) one. This cluster as a group determines (DET) a predicational (PRED) function and a referential (REF) one, which in turn determines (DET) or affects overt forms via an expressional (EXPR) component.

The CS determines the internal processes in the CG, which is itself also complex. The CG too possesses the same three conjoined functions VOL, PRESP, and ATT, which determine (DET) two further components.


COMMUNICATION ACT
DET
COM SOURCE F
COM GOAL


COM SOURCE
DET
CONJ
CONJ
VOL
PRESP
ATT
VOL(EXx,Obj1,T1,L1)
BLV(EXx,Obj2,T1,L1)
EMOT(Exx,Obj3,T1,L1)
DET
CONJ
REF
PRED
EXPR
PRED(Agx,Obj4,T1L1)
REF(Agx,Obj5,T1,L1)
EXPR(Agx,Obj6,T1,L1)


COM GOAL
DET
CONJ
CONJ
VOL
PRESP
ATT
VOL(Exy,0O6,T2,L2)
BLV(Exy,O7,T2,L2)
EMOT(Exy,O8,T2,L2)
DET
PRCT
INTRP
PRCV(Exy,O9,T2,L2)
INTRP(Exy,O10,T2,L2)

Unlike the CS, the CG's final pair are *perceptional* (PRCPT), which in turn has its effects on an ultimate *interpretational* (INTRP) function.

That is, I am attempting to reconstruct the notion that what a speaker wills (VOL), believes (PRESP) and feels (ATT) have direct bearing on what he will predicate (PRED) and refer (REF) to and that the latter dictate the overt form of expression (EXPR). On the other hand an addressee's will, beliefs, and attitudes have a filtering effect on what he perceives (PRCT) and thereby understands/ interprets (INTRP) the message to be.

4. THE UTILITY OF A THEORY OF USE

4.1. PRAGMATICS AND SYNTAX

If syntax is not realistically viewable as an autonomous system and if, in fact, it is within a pragmatic matrix that syntax must ultimately be explained, what kinds of questions does a pragmatically defined syntax confront? I will identify here only two areas of focus that have been brought up in recent years (though the possibilities are richer than that), namely, *shared knowledge of speech participants and empathy.*

That speakers and hearers must share certain presuppositions or information in order for communication to proceed is a non-controversial enough observation. That such questions enter into the specification of constraints in syntax, however, has not always been received with the same general agreement. But work in more recent years on *discourse analysis* has raised our eyes beyond the sentence and almost inevitably found it natural to invoke pragmatic factors to explain syntactic phenomena.

One example of reinterpreting syntax within the broader framework of use is Gary 1976. Briefly, what Gary showed for three of Emonds's (1970) *root transformations* in English was that although *syntactically* they all involved the permutation of an adverbial element or participial phrase with the subject NP so that the adverbial or participial is in sentence-initial position and the subject is in sentence-final position, they also involve an outcome that is *contrary to expectations* that the speaker has established for the hearer earlier in the *discourse.*

Noting that for Emonds a root transformation is one which moves constituents into positions that would not be generated by the phrase structure rules of the grammar, Gary goes on to discuss, for example, Emonds's *Directional Adverb Preposing* (DAP), the root transformation that creates (2)b out of (2)a;

(2) a. The dog trotted up the street.
    b. Up the street the dog trotted.

That DAP can take place in English is clear. The question is *when, why,* or *under what conditions.* To answer that, notice the relative acceptability of (3)a vs. (3)b as the final sentence in the following context:

(3) Keith Sebastian had given me detailed instructions on how to find his house; he was to meet me there with the money. I drove up the driveway and got out of my car. Just as the car door closed, I heard the main door to the house open.

a. Keith Sebastian / Dan Carlyle / The Sheriff — stepped out of the house.

b. Out of the house stepped — ? Keith Sebastian. / Dan Carlyle. / the Sheriff.

Though it might seem possible to invoke a fairly mechanical rule of syntax to confirm that the constituent *Keith Sebastian* must occur as in (3)a in the fronted (foregrounded) position as subject because of a rule to the effect that that noun reference has already been made in an earlier sentence and no ambiguous intervening (proper) noun has occured. Something like that rule does, indeed, play a part in helping us, for example, track pronominal referents in discourse. But there seems to be more involved, as illustrated in the following text fragment:

(4) Keith Sebastian had given me detailed instructions on how to find his house; he was supposed to have met me there with the money. But according to the radio, he had just been killed under mysterious circumstances. In a daze I drove up the driveway to his house and got out of my car. Just as the car door closed, I heard the main door to the house open.

a. ? Keith Sebastian stepped out of the house.

b. Out of the house stepped Keith Sebastian.

From this example it seems clear that alternative closing sentence (4)b is more acceptable because the *expectations* which the *speaker/writer* and *hearer/reader* share that Sebastian is dead are suddenly *reversed.* That is, DAP involves a *pragmatically based contrary-to-speech-participant-expectation* constraint. The standard sentence (4)a comes across as too 'cool' and unsurprised to be acceptable.

One final example shows that DAP depends on shared presuppositions of speaker and hearer:

(5) Sam had been looking forward to taking a hot sauna all afternoon. About 5:30 he went to the YMCA and undressed and then headed for the sauna room. Just as he reached the door,

out of the sauna stepped
a. a girl.
b. ? a man.

The occurrence of (5)a with DAP sounds correct – we are surprised, because of shared cultural presuppositions. On the other hand, (5)b in a DAP sentence strikes one as odd, precisely because it would not be contrary to expectations to run into another man at a sauna.

Turning now to the notion of *empathy,* I will summarize a few aspects of a conception of the effects of *speaker attitude* or *point of view* on things syntactic.

Susumo Kuno (1975) in the spirit of the Prague School Functional Sentence Perspective approach has suggested a speaker empathy explanation for a variety of syntactic patterns in Japanese and English which in recent years have been treated in purely formal syntactic terms within the generative tradition.

Discussing *Passivization* in English, Kuno (1975:31) advances the following hypothesis concerning what he calls the *Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy* (SSEH):

> It is easiest for the speaker to empathize with the referent of the subject; it is next easiest for him to empathize with the referent of the object; . . . It is next to impossible for the speaker to empathize with the referent of the by-passive agentive:
>
> Subject > Object > By-passive Agentive

He claims in this connection that 'one of the functions of Passivization is to elevate the referent of the object to the most prominent position in the Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy and to defocalize the referent of the subject to the position which cannot re-

ceive the speaker's empathy.' He offers in (6) as an example of empathy-controlled phenomena a matter that is usually treated as a peculiarity of simplex-sentence reflexivization:

(6) a. John talked to Bill about *his* friend.

b. John talked to Bill about *his* dear old friend.

c. Bill was talked to by John about *his* dear old friend.

The question here is how English speakers go about interpreting the proper antecedents for the reflexive *his*. It will not be difficult to imagine contexts in which sentence (6)a could have *his* referring to either John or Bill. For sentence (6)b the addition of *dear old* seems to cooccur with a judgment that *his* more likely refers to John (the subject). Under Passivization in (6)c, however, the decision is heavily (who could ask for unanimity among linguists!) in favor of *his* referring to Bill (as subject) rather than John (as by-passive agentive). Kuno's point is simply that behind purely syntactic rules of reflexivization within a passive context in English there stands a more broadly explanatory set of speaker empathy values to be invoked, namely those in his SSEH.

Kuno (1975:37) also identifies a *Speech-Act Participant Empathy Hierarchy* (SAPEH) according to which:

> It is easiest for the speaker to empathize with himself; it is next easiest for him to empathize with third persons to the exclusion of the speaker or hearer who explicitly appears in the pronominal form in a sentence:
>
> Speaker > Hearer > Third Person

Thus a sentence like (7)a strikes us as normal while (7)b is somehow more awkward though apparently perfect in syntactic form:

(7) a. I criticized Mary.

b. ? Mary was criticized by me.

According to Kuno's empathy analysis (7) b strikes a somewhat discordant note because:

(i) Consistent with Speech-Act Participant Empathy Hierarchy, the speaker most easily empathizes with himself and least easily with a third party to the exclusion of the speaker represented in pronominal form (i.e. *me).*

(ii) And consistent with the Surface Structure Empathy Hierarchy the speaker finds it easiest to empathize with the subject and least easy to empathize with a by-passive agentive (i.e. *by me).*

To restate Kuno's hypothesis in Relational Grammar terms – English speakers tend not to demote themselves especially in pronominal form. This seems particularly true when the semantic content of the proposition renders avoidance of personal involvement less natural, for example, when the speaker is criticizing someone. An exception to this rule would constitute an objective, detached reportorial style such as:

(8) Just such a prediction was made by { this reporter / yours truly / me } on

December 3, 1929.

The Speech Act Participant Empathy Hierarchy often bears on the order of conjoined names of people we know and especially family members. For example, I always refer to my brother and his wife as 'Dick and Karen.' Karen's mother, however, always refers to the same two people as 'Karen and Dick', that is, putting her daughter's name first. This pattern seems to hold for many speakers in my culture. The rule seems to be:

speaker's in-group member > out-group member

Approaching from an empathy perspective what could also be looked at as shared speaker-hearer knowledge, Kuno (1975:40) defines a *Topic Empathy Hierarchy* as follows:

> It is easier for the speaker to empathize with an object (e.g. person) that he has been talking about than an object that he has just introduced into discourse for the first time.

Discourse-Anaphoric > Discourse-Nonanaphoric

Consider his examples of greater and lesser acceptability of (9)a over (9)b:

(9) a. John encountered an eight-foot tall girl on the street.

b. ? An eight-foot tall girl encountered John on the street.

The problem here seems to be that the normal order in English of a *definite* reference (i.e. one previously referred to or assumed by the speaker) typically precedes an *indefinite* one. Thus (9)a comes across as normal, but (9)b as somewhat less so, having as it does an *indefinite*,+ *definite* reference order. Thus the speaker tends in Kuno's terms to empathize with the referent of the definite NP and favors that in preposed position. This position preference is in line with Kuno's Syntactic Prominent Principle (1975:44):

> Give syntactic prominence to the person who you are describing who you are empathizing with.

Consider also the following examples:

(10) a. Mary talked to someone about herself.

b. ? Mary talked to someone about himself.

Sentence (10)b, to the degree that it is problematical for English speakers, is so, according to Kuno, because 'dative objects, since they are indefinite, cannot easily receive the speaker's empathy, and for this reason they resist the use of reflexive pronouns with them as antecedents.'

4.2. PRAGMATIC LINGUISTICS AND RHETORIC

Rhetoric, traditionally known as the art of persuasion, played a prominent role in classical thought on language. Modern linguists, however, with their typically narrower focus have in general ignored this area of language use. One of the exceptions is Young, Becker and Pike (1970).

The chasm between linguistics and rhetoric is not exclusively due to myopia on the part of linguists. From a standard handbook on classical rhetoric (Corbett 1965:387) we have the following distinction between grammar and rhetoric:

GRAMMAR:	phoneme-syllable-word-phrase-clause
RHETORIC:	word-phrase-clause-paragraph-division-whole composition

Though there is overlap from the rhetorician's point of view, grammar is often thought of as being concerned with 'correctness' (that is, the rules and restrictions on putting words into phrases and clauses) while rhetoric is concerned with 'effectiveness' (that is, the best choice of possible expressions to achieve an effect.)

The matter reduces, for our purposes here, to the question of whether or not one conceives of 'linguist' as equivalent to 'grammarian'. To the pragmatics-oriented linguist the answer must be 'NO! ' But having taken that stance, what point of overlap or contact can be adduced beyond those that Corbett has pointed out?

I will mention only two such mutual interests here, but I believe they are major. First, a pragmatic linguistics is interested, as is clear from earlier discussion, in *whole discourse* (as opposed to only sentence) analysis. Second, such a linguistics takes into account as crucial the rich variety of speaker-addressee factors that control language form.

Classical rhetoric recognized the following five parts to argumentative discourse:

exordium	'introduction'
narratio	'statement of fact'
confirmatio	'refutation'
peroratio	'conclusion'

Thus a speech of persuasion first contains an *introduction of the topic* (and in a way that ingratiates the speaker with the audience), then *lays out the facts* of the case as background (for example, the charges against a client and the defense's rejection of them in forensic debate). *Confirmation* presents proof that the orator's statements are to be accepted and *refutation* meets opponent's charges, if any. Finally, the speech offers a summation in its *conclusion* (again, in a fashion that aims to attract audience empathy).

Longacre (1976) presents an account of 'deep' and 'surface' aspects of linguistic structure ranging from clause to discourse. Conscious of the rhetorician's concern with whole compositions (as reflected above), he concludes that 'the rhetorician's anatomy of plot is therefore the deep structure of climactic narrative'. He presents the following diagram (here simplified) of narrative discourse:

	Deep Structure	Surface Structure
		title
		aperture (formulaic) opening
1.	exposition: 'lay it out'	stage
2.	inciting moment: 'get something going'	pre-peak episodes
3.	developing conflict: 'keep the heat on'	pre-peak episodes
4.	climax: 'knot it all up proper'	peak
5.	denouement: 'loosen it'	peak
6.	final suspense: 'keep untangling'	post-peak episodes
7	conclusion: 'wrap it up'	closure
		finis (formulaic ending)

Thus the whole discourse is viewed as amenable to analysis with many of the same conceptual tools that the linguist brings to his work on syntax generally. For example, Longacre draws an explicit parallel between role and surface case for clause and plot and surface structures for discourse.

Without belaboring the point, it seems clear that for approaches of this type the interests of linguistics and rhetoric have converged in fundamental ways. And this development is not unnatural – given a pragmatic conception of linguistics.

I return now to the observation that a pragmatic linguistics, which takes into account and makes explicit reference to *speaker-addressee* factors in its explanations, shares to that extent in the central orientation of rhetoric. Rhetoric is concerned with language as an instrument at the disposal of a speaker trying to influence his hearers.

Aristotle declared as the three means of persuading others, the following:

logos:	the appeal to reason
pathos:	the appeal to emotions
ethos:	the appeal of our personality or character

That is, a speaker may persuade his audience via their *logical presuppositions* or their *feelings*. In addition by projecting an image of himself as (in Quintillian's terms) 'a good man speaking' the speaker may predispose the *will* of the audience to accept his proposals. In his survey of rhetoric Corbett (1965) notes in a similar vein the central concern of Campbell in his *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* with the psychology of the audience and the functions of rhetoric as enlightening the understanding, pleasing the imagination, moving the passions, and influencing the will. Corbett (1965:568) also observes Kenneth Burke's definition of 'new rhetoric' as one not so much of persuasion as *appeal*. That is, 'when men use symbols to induce cooperation in other human beings, they must *identify* themselves with the audience, must, in Burke's term, become *consubstantial* with them'.

Recalling the communication act model which I proposed earlier, note that it explicitly identifies as three of the functions needed for an adequate accounting for linguistic form, the following:



Thus what is central for rhetoric is also crucial for other aspects of a pragmatic linguistics.

4.3. A PRAGMATIC LINGUISTICS AND TRANSLATION.

An area of language activity which has received little attention by theoretical linguistics generally is that of translation. This is not surprising in view of the preoccupation of modern linguistics with the formal description of the rules, structures, systems, etc. of *langue*. Such a formidable *intra*-language task has made it easy to leave matters of *inter*-language equivalence aside. Thinking on translation has been pretty much left therefore to those with practical interests in language. For the theoretician it has been put off until another day. If, as it seems, we are at present viewing the rise of a pragmatic linguistics, the day for the integration of translation as a theoretically respectable part of linguistics seems to have arrived.

Though I shall not here attempt to say all that a pragmatic linguistics means for translation, I would like to observe that, as in rhetoric, the reinstatement of human speakers and hearers in the overall linguistic model enables linguistics to be relevant to translation theory.

Nida and Taber (1969:22) discuss the priority of *dynamic equivalence* over *formal correspondence* in judging the adequacy of a translation.

They say:

> If we look at translations in terms of the receptors, rather than in terms of their respective forms, then we introduce another point of view, the intelligibility of the translation. Such intelligibility is not, however, to be measured merely in terms of whether the words are understandable and the sentences grammatically constructed [i.e. formal correspondence], but in terms of the total impact the message has on the one who receives it [i.e. dynamic equivalence].

They (1969:23) diagram the translation process as follows:



Thus an original speaker, source (S) conveys a message (M_1) to his original audience, receptors (R_1). The bilingual translator to perform his function must first become a displaced receptor (R) of sorts and then in turn a source (S), producing (often in a totally distinct historical-cultural context) a message (M_2) to be conveyed to new receptors (R_2). Now the translator-critic (R', S') has traditionally concentrated in his judgments only on the adequacy of the match between M_1 and M_2 with regard to form and meaning (the dotted arrows). What Nida and Taber advocate, however, is that the reaction of the receptors R_1 and R_2 be the focus of critical attention in seeking in dynamic equivalence in translation (wavy arrows).

If, as Nida and Taber recommend, the translation critic must in principle inquire of R_1 and R_2 their responses, what classes of such responses are to be expected? (I leave aside for our purposes the problem of how to 'inquire' of Achilles, for example, his response to the pleas of Odysseus to return to help the Greeks in battle. For ancient speeches, obviously, indirect methods must be employed, e.g. via the words of Achilles and others in the Iliad.) The responses that Nida and Taber (1969:24-27) have in mind are associated with three functions of language that they identify as: *informative, expressive,* and *imperative*. Consequently an adequate translation – *like all adequate communication* – 'must not only provide information which people can *understand* but must present the message in such a way that people can *feel* its relevance (the expressive element in communication) and can then respond to it *in action* (the imperative function)'. Thus again, as in rhetoric and as sketched earlier under pragmatic models, the inevitable triad of human personality is needed for translation also. It is:



4.4. A PRAGMATIC LINGUISTICS AND THE MECHANISM OF LINGUISTIC CHANGE

Not even a brief survey of the need for a pragmatic approach to language study should ignore the role that *humans* (not just sound and syntax) play in the processes of historical evolution of language. As Labov (1972:14) has pointed out, Sapir complained long ago that:

> In linguistics, abstracted speech sounds, words, and the arrangement of words have come to have so authentic a vitality that one can speak of 'regular sound changes' and 'loss of gender' without knowing or caring who opened their mouths, at what time, to communicate what to whom.

The by now famous work of Labov (1972) will be recognized as the inspiration for the title for this section. His study of the mechanism of linguistic change concerned the centralization of *(aw)* on Martha's Vineyard and the raising of *(oh)* in New York City. His conclusions about the mechanism involved may be roughly summarized as: what starts with *some words* in some *sub-groups* expands in both these dimensions to *more words* in *more subgroups* up to some ultimate socio-linguistic limit. Movements of the linguistic variable within phonological space gives rise to general readjustments within the total system (along lines of Martinet's *économie des changements phonétiques).* Depending on whether change originated in a high status group or a low status group, the change may be either stigmatized or become a prestige model.

Labov's (1972:537) broader theoretical point is that:

> *internal, structural* pressures and *sociolinguistic* pressures act in *systematic alternation* in the mechanism of change. It can no longer be seriously argued that the linguist must limit his explanations of change to the mutual influences of linguistic elements defined by cognition. Nor can it be argued that a changing linguistic system is autonomous . . . we can make the stronger claim that it is *not possible* to complete an analysis of structural relation *within* a linguistic system and then turn to external relations. (emphases mine, KG).

I began this paper with Zymurgy's brilliant insight regarding worms and cans. Labov's statement above now leads me to close within a final selection from that growing body of wisdom that has come to be called 'Murphology' (inspired by Murphy's Law). I refer, of course, to Muir's Law (Bloch 1980:94), according to which:

> When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.

SELECTED REFERENCES

AUSTIN, J.L. 1962. How to do things with words. New York: Oxford University Press.

BLOCH, ARTHUR. 1979. Murphy's law and other reasons why things go wrong! Los Angeles: Price, Stern, Sloan Publishers.

________________ 1980. Murphy's law: book two. More reasons why things go wrong. Los Angeles: Price, Stern, Sloan Publishers.

BLOOMFIELD, LEONARD. 1933. Language. New York: Henry Holt and Co.

CORBETT, EDWARD P. J. 1965. Classical rhetoric for the modern student. New York: Oxford University Press.

EMONDS, JOSEPH. 1970. Root and structure preserving transformations. M.I.T. doctoral dissertation.

FODOR, JANET DEAN. 1977. Semantics: theories of meaning in generative grammar. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

GARY, NORMAN. 1976. A discourse analysis of certain root transformations in English. IULC reproduction.

GREENBERG, JOSEPH H. 1964. Linguistics and ethnology. In Dell Hymes (ed.), Language in culture and society, 27-35.

GREGERSON, KENNETH. 1976. On communication acts. Irian journal (Cenderawasih University, Irian Jaya, Indonesia).

______________ . 1979. Predicate and argument in Rengao grammar. University of Texas at Arlington and Summer Institute of Linguistics publication no. 61 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971).

GRICE, H. PAUL. 1975. Logic and conversation. In Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (ed.), Syntax and semantics. Volume 3: Speech acts. pp. 41-58. New York: Academic Press.

GUMPERZ, JOHN J. 1975. Foreword to Mary Sanches and Ben G. Blount (ed.), Sociocultural dimensions of language use, xi-xxi. New York: Academic Press.

HYMES, DELL. 1964. Language in culture and society. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.

______________ . 1972. Models of the interaction of language and social life. In John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (ed.), Directions in sociolinguistics, 35-71. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

KUHN, THOMAS S. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol. 2, no. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

KUNO, SUSUMO. 1975. Empathy and syntax. In S. Kuno (ed.), Harvard studies in syntax and semantics, vol. 1.1-73.

LABOV, WILLIAM. 1972. On the mechanism of linguistic change. In John Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.), Directions in sociolinguistics, 512-38. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

LEECH, GEOFFREY; 1974. Semantics. London: Penguin.

LONGACRE, R. E. 1976. An anatomy of speech notions. Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press.

LYONS, JOHN. 1977. Semantics. 2 Vols. Cambridge: University Press.

MALINOWSKY, BRONISLAW. 1964. The dilemma of contemporary linguistics. In Hymes (ed.), Language in culture and society, p. 63-65.

MARTINET, ANDRÉ 1955. Économie des changements phonétiques. Bibliotheca Romanica. Ser. Prima, Manualia et Commentationes. Vol. X. Berne: Francke.

MORRIS, CHARLES W. 1938. Foundations of a theory of signs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

NIDA, EUGENE A. 1949. Morphology: the descriptive analysis of words. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

______________ . 1951. A system for the description of semantic elements. Word 7.1-14.

__________________ . 1958. Analysis of meaning and dictionary making. IJAL 24.279-92.

__________________ . 1975. Exploring semantic structures. Internationale Bibliothek fur Allgemeine Linguistik.

__________________ and Charles R. Taber. 1969. The theory and practice of translation. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

PIKE, KENNETH L. 1947. Grammatical prerequisites to phonemic analysis. Word 3.155-72.

YOUNG RICHARD E., ALTON L. BECKER and KENNETH L. PIKE 1970. Rhetoric: discovery and change. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.

ROSS, J. R. 1970. On declarative sentences. Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum, eds., Readings in English transformational grammar. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Company.

SADOCK, JERROLD. 1974. Toward a linguistic theory of speech acts. New York: Academic Press.

SEARLE, JOHN R. 1976. A classification of illocutionary acts. Language in Society 5.1-23.

VERSCHUEREN, JEF. 1977. The analysis of speech act verbs: theoretical preliminaries. Indiana University Linguistics Club reproduction.